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Abstract
This paper analyzes the problem of collecting property taxes in fiscally decentralized
developing economies. The property tax is arguably the most important source of
own revenues for local governments around the world, and economists generally
agree that, although imperfect, the property tax is a good local tax. In practice,
however, the property tax does not always become a productive revenue source and
local governments do not gain the fiscal autonomy required to realize the benefits of
fiscal decentralization. This problem is rather common among developing economies
and particularly severe in Latin America. One of the main reasons for the poor tax
performance of Latin American countries seems to be the lack of administrative
capacity at the local level. This problem is notably aggravated, we argue, by a
deficient design of the fiscal decentralization system. We also identify the main
determinants of property tax performance in Latin American countries, and provide
guidance for future reforms in the region.

* International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies at Georgia State University. We are
thankful to ECLAC for financial support and Juan Pablo Jimenez and Gustavo Canavire-Bacarreza for helpful
comments. We are also thankful to Andrea Podestá for useful research assistance.
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1. Introduction
The property tax is arguably the most important source of own revenues for local governments
around the world. Many fiscally decentralized economies as well as an increasing number of
countries that have embarked upon a decentralization process look at the property tax as the main
source of revenue autonomy for their sub-national governments. This practice is well matched
with policy principles. There is widespread agreement among economists and decentralization
experts on that, although not entirely perfect, the property tax possesses several characteristics
that are desirable in the context of sub-national government finance.
Besides its theoretical advantages, however, in practice not everything is well with the
property tax. The property tax is difficult to implement, costly to administer, and unpopular
among taxpayers. It is well known that many countries around the world struggle to produce any
significant amounts of revenue from this tax source. These difficulties are more prevalent among
developing countries and, particularly in Latin America, the property tax continues to be a
predominant policy concern among policymakers. With very few exceptions, Latin American
countries have not been able to develop revenue-productive property tax systems. Moreover,
Latin America has been identified in the economic literature as a region with relatively low tax
effort (Bird et al., 2006), and with a level of tax revenue performance that is lower than the
average in developing and transition countries (Bird et al., 2008; Ahmad and Brosio, 2008). The
problems of low tax effort and revenue performance are especially acute and challenging in the
case of the property tax.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze the causes of the poor tax performance of
the property tax in Latin America and to identify policies that could help with the current
impasse. Part of what we find is conventional wisdom. The lack of financial and technical means
to assemble accurate, comprehensive and updated cadastres is clearly one of the main reasons
explaining the lackluster performance of the property tax. In fact, there is an extensive literature
addressing these issues and suggesting more feasible alternatives to the assessment of property
values. All these lessons are relevant to Latin America and they should be internalized by
policymakers. But we also arrive at less conventional findings. Previous analyses of the
performance of the property tax have given much less attention to the design of the fiscal
decentralization system within which the property tax must operate. The arrangement of fiscal
incentives in the decentralization system, we contend, can also play a crucial role in determining
the extent to which the property tax is used in practice. We argue that the realignment of fiscal
incentives must be an important part of the solution for a more effective use of the property tax
in the region.
We emphasize the mutual dependence between a sound fiscal decentralization process
and the successful devolution of the property tax to local governments. In order to become a
productive revenue source, the decentralization of the property tax also requires that local
authorities be politically accountable to their communities, be endowed with a significant degree
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of fiscal autonomy, face the correct incentives within the context of central government policies,
and have sufficient administrative capacity to carry out tax and expenditure policies.
A few words on the scope of the paper are in order at this time. The concept of property
is a broad one, encompassing different forms of wealth over which different taxes can be
applied. In general, we can differentiate between real or immovable property, which includes
land and structures, from personal property, consisting of those tangible and intangible assets
that are not attached to the land. In addition, taxes can be applied to the stock of properties, their
transfer, or the capital gains realized on their sale. This paper focuses on the annual taxation of
the stock of immovable property, which is generally considered among the most efficient modes
of property taxation and constitutes the bulk of property tax revenues around the world.1
In this paper we also distinguish between the analysis of property tax collections at the
sub-national level within a country and that across countries. We explain that certain variables
that are exogenous for sub-national governments within a country, like the legal and institutional
frameworks, are likely to be endogenously determined at the country level, and thus they should
also be considered as components of the national tax effort. Unfortunately, the information
available at the sub-national government level is, in general, still very limited, so the
econometric analysis tends to be more informative at the international level. Moreover, even in
that case, the data available for Latin American countries are quite incomplete, which naturally
limits the validity of our results. Our data set consists of an unbalanced panel of nine countries
with years of observation covering the period 1990-2007.
We suggest that the improvement of property tax collections and the realization of
effective revenue autonomy may require, paradoxically, a more active involvement of the central
government in the implementation, administration and collection of the property tax. The central
governments in the region might provide technical and financial assistance to the less
administratively developed local governments, and in some cases might temporarily retain some
responsibilities over different aspects of this revenue source. In addition, the central government
could contribute by helping to strengthen the relationship between autonomy and accountability
at the sub-national level, and by redesigning the intergovernmental transfer systems in a way that
does not provide incentives to reduce sub-national own tax collections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview
of the main characteristics and importance of the property tax in Latin America. In section three
we evaluate the property tax in terms of the desirable properties of a good sub-national tax. In
section four we develop an analytical framework in which we identify the determining factors of
tax collection performance of sub-national governments. This analytical framework provides a
sounder basis for the comparison of performances of sub-national governments within a country
and across different countries, where performance is measured on the basis of actual revenue
1

The taxation of property comes in many different modalities and within each one of them different approaches
have been used in the international practice, all of which offer different advantages and disadvantages. Many of
these are reviewed in Bird and Slack (2004) and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008a, and forthcoming).
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collections vis-à-vis the potential collections reflected by existing fiscal capacities. In section
five we present the empirical analysis. The last section concludes.

2. Property taxation in Latin America
Despite the generally accepted potential of property taxes in tax systems all over the world,
in practice they are a minor source of public revenues, specially by comparison to other taxes
also commonly used worldwide such as income taxes or the VAT or sales taxes. The property
tax is especially far from being a mainstay of the revenue system in developing and transitional
countries.
To put the performance of property taxes in Latin America into perspective, we compare
it with the performance of other regions of the world. As shown in Table 1, property taxes in
developing and transitional countries raise less revenue relative to GDP than OECD countries. In
the early 2000s property taxes in OECD countries represented 2.12 percent of GDP, while for
developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent and, for transition countries, 0.68 percent. The
trend for revenues in all three groups of countries has been slightly upwards since the 1970s.
The figures in Table 1 suggest that the overall performance of the property tax in terms of GDP
is associated with the level of economic development; for example, OECD countries rely more
on the property tax than do developing countries. However, that relationship is not necessarily
monotonic and Latin American countries are found to perform less well than the average
developing country.
Table 1. The property tax as a share of GDP in representative groups of countries (percent)

All countries

1970s
0.77

1980s
0.73

1990s
0.75

2000s*
1.04

(number of countries)

(37)

(49)

(59)

(65)

OECD countries

1.24

1.31

1.44

2.12

(number of countries)

(16)

(18)

(16)

(18)

Transition countries

0.34

0.59

0.54

0.68

(1)

(4)

(20)

(18)

Developing countries

0.42

0.36

0.42

0.60

(number of countries)

(20)

(27)

(23)

(29)

Latin American countries

…

…

0.36

0.37

(number of countries)

(number of countries)
…
…
(8)
* The data for 2000s is for five years from 2000 to 2004.
Note: Figures in parenthesis represent the number of countries considered in each computation.
Source: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) and ECLAC.

(10)

Table 2 presents the measures of property tax performance for some Latin American
countries. Even though the reliance on the property tax is low, there is still a significant degree of
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variation across countries. For example, in Peru property tax revenues in recent years (2005-07)
represent 0.16 percent of GDP, while in Bolivia for the same period that figure is about four
times larger, at 0.62 percent of GDP. There is no clear trend over time but on average the relative
importance of property taxes has decreased over time. There are also some cases where property
tax performance has consistently increased over time, like in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and
Guatemala; while in Mexico property taxes have represented 0.18 percent of GDP, without
changing since the early 1990s.
Table 2. Reliance on the property tax as a share of GDP in Latin American countries

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guatemala
Mexico
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Latin American countries

1990-94
0.65
…
0.37
0.55
0.25
0.10
0.09
0.18
…
…
0.52
0.33

1995-99
0.62
…
0.41
0.65
0.46
0.13
0.07
0.18
0.36
…
0.70
0.40

2000-04
0.59
0.69
0.42
0.70
0.48
0.13
0.14
0.18
0.39
0.17
0.71
0.38

2005-07
0.44
0.62
0.44
0.59
0.54
0.14
0.16
0.18
…
0.16
…
0.36

Source: ECLAC.

Central to this paper is the question of which factors may help explain variations in the
use of property taxes in Latin America. It seems quite certain that property taxes remain the great
unrealized promise for local tax autonomy in Latin America. Like in some other regions of the
world, the yield of the property tax remains lower than its potential; but in Latin America the
distance between potential and reality appears to be much larger. The reasons we explore in this
paper are multiple, including low political will and disincentive effects of revenue sharing and
transfers, and outdated and poorly equipped tax administrations. These factors would seem to
translate into generous exemptions and low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value
assessments, incomplete registries and cadastres and lack of willingness and means of enforcing
collections.
This lackluster performance of property taxes in Latin America and the differences
observed among countries are likely to be related to the different arrangements for discretion on
rate setting or administration of the property tax. Some of the main institutional features in the
assignment and administration of the property tax across Latin American countries are presented
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in Appendix I.2 For the most part, Latin American countries assign the property tax to municipal
governments, although there are “full” exceptions like in the case of the Dominican Republic
where this tax remains a central tax, and “partial” exceptions where some authority over taxes
remains at the central level (e.g., Brazil for rural taxes, Guatemala, and Panama) or at the
provincial level (Argentina). In most cases, municipalities are also given some authority to
change tax rates, at times within legislated limits, but here there are also exceptions. For
example, Chile does not give that authority to the municipalities and the states or provinces in
Mexico and Argentina also share in that authority. For the administration of the tax, the central
governments (the provinces in the case of Argentina) are most frequently responsible for
updating the cadastre; in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Mexico the cadastre is a municipal function.
In terms of assigning the responsibility for billing and collections there is a large variety of
practices with these functions at times exclusively assigned to the central or municipal
governments and other times these functions are shared by different levels of government.
Finally, the predominant approach to the assessment of properties is market valuation.
A priori, we can theorize on the positive and negative aspects of the assignment of
specific functions vis-à-vis the revenue productivity of property taxes. For example, the
assignment of administrative functions at the municipal level may have certain advantages, such
as better information about the properties and potentially stronger incentives to collect taxes, but
the central authorities might also have advantages, such as better skilled and remunerated
officials and stronger authority to make things happen. In the next section we explore in more
depth the role of property taxation in financing local governments and the advantages and
disadvantages of different administrative schemes. Ultimately, we will rely on our empirical
analysis to discern the direction and statistical significance of the different administrative
arrangements on tax collections from the property tax.

3. The role of property taxation on local government financing
There is a widespread agreement among economists and policymakers about the
appropriateness and convenience of assigning the property tax to local governments. Indeed,
while the theoretical normative analyses developed in the economic literature suggest that the
property tax is a good source of local government revenue, in practice most of the decentralized
economies in the world have assigned, at least partially, the responsibility over the property tax
to local governments. This matching of theory and practice, however, does not imply that the
decentralization of the property tax has always been carried out in accordance with the normative
prescriptions developed in the economic literature. In many cases, either because of the
difficulties associated with its implementation, or because of poorly designed incentives, the
property tax has not become a significant source of revenues.
2

For a detailed description of property tax systems in Latin America, see De Cesare and Lazo Marín (2008).

Explaining Property Tax Collections in Developing Countries: The Case of Latin America

7

The economic role currently assigned to property taxation has been shaped by a vast and
longstanding literature analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative tax revenue
sources. In this section we briefly describe the economic arguments used to recommend the
property tax as one of the major sources of own local government revenues. We start by
discussing the general characteristics of good tax revenue sources, in general and at the local
level, and then we briefly stress the importance of tax revenue autonomy in a decentralized
system of government.

3.1 A preliminary evaluation of sub -national property taxation
Tax policy is carried out in complex environments where institutional, cultural, political, and
economic variables interact in order to determine not only the economic effects of certain tax
instruments, but also their feasibility as policy tools. In reality, there are no easy answers
regarding the desirability of one tax instrument over another, and economists usually rely on a
set of widely accepted criteria or principles in order to describe a “good tax” and evaluate the
appropriateness of alternative tax instruments. Among the most commonly used principles we
find the following:


Efficiency: A tax should not induce significant behavioral responses of individuals and
firms; or in other words, it should not distort the adequate allocation of resources in the
economy. When taxpayers bear their burden in accordance with the benefit they receive
(that is, when the “benefit principle” is fulfilled) then the tax approximates the role of a user
fee and is considered as an efficient tax. Indeed, the behavioral responses induced by
(rightly set) user fees can be interpreted as the result of a correcting incentive (similar to
what happens in private markets), because the adjustment in the behavior of the individual
or the firm is made in order to pay the correct price of the public good.



Equity and fairness: The principle of horizontal equity calls for (or regards as fair) an equal
treatment of taxpayers in identical conditions. In contrast, the concept of vertical equity
allows for several possible arrangements in which a tax can be said to be regressive,
proportional or progressive as long as the tax burden increases in a lower, equal or higher
proportion with the ability to pay. The ability to pay principle states that taxpayers with
greater ability to pay should bear a greater tax burden, but the judgment on what is to be
considered fair is a matter to be solved by each community or society. In any case, in order
to become a good revenue source, a tax should be considered fair by the taxpayers.



Revenue adequacy: A tax should raise a significant amount of revenues relative to the costs
of collection and expenditure needs of a government. In addition, the tax base should be
stable and rather insensitive to cyclical fluctuations.



Low costs of administration and compliance: Administration costs reduce the share of tax
collections available to finance public goods and services. Similarly, compliance costs
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reduce the share of taxpayers‟ income available for private consumption. If these costs are
relatively high then other tax revenue sources might be preferable.


Political acceptability: A tax that is not acceptable either to the taxpayers or to a significant
portion of the political class might simply be impossible to implement. Even if it is
implemented, in order to be successful, a tax requires a high degree of cooperation of all
relevant agents and institutions. Failing to reach this cooperation might result in low
voluntary compliance, inadequate or unrealistic laws, and deficient enforcement.



Minimize tax avoidance and tax evasion. A tax should not induce significant, legal or
illegal, efforts to elude the tax burden. Both types of responses erode the tax base, create
deviations from the targeted incidence, distort the relative prices in the economy and might
aggravate problems in horizontal and vertical equity.

No tax instrument perfectly fulfills all these principles nor could it be considered as
superior to all alternative tax instruments in all conditions. In reality, although these principles of
taxation serve as a guide to describe the characteristics of a “good” tax instrument, they must be
evaluated in the specific context where a tax is implemented. A general evaluation of the
property tax, therefore, can be expected to lead to different conclusions depending on its
structure, whether the property tax is assigned to the central government or to the local
governments, and so on.
Table 3 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of assigning the property
tax to the central or to the local governments. 3 Local governments have an advantage in terms of
economic efficiency because their proximity to the taxpayers allows them to better fulfill the
benefit principle. Indeed, the central government is more subject to the “common pool problem,”
by which those who contribute to financing the public goods (the country as a whole if the tax is
assigned to the center) are not necessarily the beneficiaries of public expenditures. In general, the
lower the size of the jurisdiction and the greater the share of the property tax on local revenues,
the greater the ability of local governments to use property taxation as a benefit tax.
The central government seems to have a clear advantage in terms of the ability to address
the problems of horizontal and vertical equity and fairness. Since Musgrave (1959) the economic
literature distinguishes macroeconomic stability, an equitable distribution of income and the
efficient allocation of resources as the three fundamental economic objectives of the (general)
government, and broadly accepts that local involvement should be restricted only (or mostly) to
contribute to the objective of allocation efficiency. The reason is that local authorities cannot
consider the macroeconomic consequences of their decisions, neither are they capable of, nor
interested in, ensuring fairness in the national context. According to this argument, local
governments should not even intervene in redistributive policies within their own jurisdictions,
3

The advantages of the property tax as a local tax are reviewed, among many others, in Oates (1999), Bird (2006),
and Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008b).
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Table 3. Comparative analysis of property taxation at the central and local levels of government
Principle
Property tax as a
Property tax as a
Central Government tax
Local Governments‟ tax
Disadvantage: the “common pool Advantage: the property tax
Efficiency
Equity and fairness
Revenue adequacy
Low administration costs

Low compliance costs
Political acceptability
Tax compliance

problem” increases with the size
approximates a user fee, especially
of the government.
as the jurisdiction size decreases.
Advantage: both vertical and
Disadvantage: heterogeneity and
horizontal disparities can be
different tax bases impose unequal
addressed at a national level.
conditions in different jurisdictions.
Advantage: less mobility and
Disadvantage: revenues can be more
variability at the national level.
volatile in smaller jurisdictions.
Advantage: better administrative
Disadvantage: implementation costs
and fiscal capacity.
might simply be unaffordable.
Disadvantage: economies of scale Advantage: firsthand knowledge of
might not be substantial.
the taxpayers and the tax base.
(Depend on the complexity of the system and
the taxpayers‟ willingness to contribute)
Disadvantage: the property tax is Advantage: visibility helps to link
very visible.
taxation with public goods benefits
and increases accountability.
Disadvantage: inflexible terms
Advantage: closer match of
and “common good problem”
taxpayers‟ preferences and better
reduce willingness to contribute.
knowledge of their ability to pay.

but rather might limit themselves to avoiding worsening the distribution of income at the local
level. 4 This consideration is especially relevant in Latin America, a region where the distribution
of income is among the worst in the world (Lopez and Perry, 2008). 5
Independently from the relative magnitude of property tax collections, the fact that
mobility is lower at the national level implies that the property tax collections would be more
stable for the central government. At the local level individual taxpayers can move out as a
response to excessive tax rates and lower the market value of properties. Firms might also decide
to leave the jurisdiction and in that case, in addition to the property value effect, the loss in tax
collections would be greater if commercial use is taxed more heavily than residential use.
Due to their potentially significant magnitude, the administration costs play a crucial role
in determining the ability of a government to adequately implement and collect the property tax.
In particular, the assessment of property values is complex and requires well prepared personnel;
building a complete cadastre is a long and expensive task. In this context the central government
usually has advantages in terms of its ability to finance and develop comprehensive cadastres.
4

The concept of equity in the distribution of income ultimately deals with who bears the burden of the tax, or the
incidence of the tax. Zodrow (2008) provides a brief review of the property tax incidence literature.
5
Based on an empirical analysis encompassing 34 developing countries and 22 developed countries, Sepulveda and
Martinez-Vazquez (2010) suggest that the local governments might actually contribute to improving the distribution
of income. However, this conclusion is subject to a public sector playing a significant role in the economy (more
than 20% of the GDP), a condition that is not observed in Latin American countries, where total expenditures of the
general government represent, on average during 2007, less than 15% of the GDP (Penn World Table).
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Moreover, local authorities in developing countries usually lack the enforcement mechanisms available
to central governments, such as legal staff, policemen, and other means to take advantage of their
proximity to tax officials and taxpayers.

Importantly, local property taxation might also have an advantage in terms of the political
acceptability. One payment (or a few) per year of a relatively high amount of money makes the
property tax a visible and an unpopular revenue source. Local authorities are in a better position
than the central government to show the taxpayers the way in which property tax revenues are
used to finance public services, and therefore to justify the tax payments as a fair price for the
benefits received. If local authorities manage to effectively match public service provision with
the preferences of the community then the taxpayers might well feel inclined to voluntary
comply with the tax law, reducing the practice of tax evasion. In this sense, an adequate supply
of public services might provide incentives to taxpayers to remain in the jurisdiction even if tax
rates are relatively high with respect to neighboring areas. The local authorities also have a better
knowledge of the taxpayers‟ ability to pay inside the jurisdiction; thus they might be able to
better monitor and enforce compliance as well as make proper adjustments to the local tax
policy. Torgler (2005) finds that the size of the informal sector is an important determinant of tax
compliance in Latin America. The informal sector represents an important share of the economy
in developing countries, and in Latin America is estimated to be around 41% of the GNP (Alm
and Martinez-Vazquez, 2007). The question is whether local governments can exploit their
advantage of being “closer” to the constituencies in order to bring more activities in the formal
sector and encourage increased voluntary compliance. Little research has been done on this
issue.
In summary, both central and local governments have advantages and disadvantages for
administering the property tax and it is not possible to assert a priori which level will perform
better. In practice, however, their strengths can be combined in mixed arrangements of authority
and responsibilities. On the one hand, the visibility of the property tax, usually considered as a
disadvantage for the central government, is a key aspect of the problem that calls for a keen
participation of local authorities in rate setting and also in the administration of the property tax.
At the local level the tax authorities might be able to use such visibility to present the property
tax as a benefit tax, enhancing political acceptability and taxpayers‟ participation in local
decisions, and potentially reducing non compliance. On the other hand, central government
intervention might be helpful to develop comprehensive cadastres, to assist in the formation of
administrative capacity and to provide policy parameters within which the creation of
inefficiencies can be contained.
tax.”
6

6

The literature has identified a number of additional desirable features of a “good local
Among these features we count, again, the correspondence between tax payments and

Discussions about the property tax and the characteristics of a good local tax are discussed, for instance, in McLure
(1994), McCluskey and Williams (1999), McCluskey and Plimmer (2007), Bahl and Bird (2008) and MartinezVazquez, Noiset and Rider (2010).
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benefits received (benefit principle), the perception of fairness, and the stability of revenue
collections. In addition, and pondering some of the arguments provided earlier in this section, the
visibility of the tax instrument is considered as a good characteristic of local taxation. Other
desirable features that are applicable specifically within the local context are:


The tax base should be relatively immovable: According to the Tiebout‟s (1956) hypothesis,
taxpayers would “vote with their feet” and efficiently reallocate themselves after
considering the combination of taxes and services offered by different local governments. In
practice, however, tax competition among sub-national governments might also lead to a
“race to the bottom,” if local governments are forced to reduce their tax rates in order to
retain the taxpayers inside the jurisdiction. As a result, the overall amount of sub-national
public expenditures may remain at a sub-optimal level.7 A consensual, but rather
conservative, position to deal with the unclear effects of mobility in economic efficiency
consists of assuming that any fiscally-induced change in taxpayers‟ behavior represents a
distortion of the efficient allocation of resources in the economy and consequently reduces
economic welfare. Moreover, it is clear that a relatively immovable tax base would allow for
more room in tax policy decisions.



The tax should be geographically neutral: Taxes should not interfere with the commercial
flow of goods and services and business location decisions across the jurisdictions. In this
case we again assume that tax-induced changes of taxpayers‟ behavior should be avoided.



Taxes should not be easily exported: The benefit principle does not hold if non-residents are
charged for the provision of local services. In addition, such a situation implies that the costs
assumed locally are reduced, which might also lead to over-provision of public services.



Significant tax revenue sources should be evenly distributed among jurisdictions: Sizeable
variations in the size of the tax base create high fiscal disparities among jurisdictions and
impose undesirable differences in the degree of revenue autonomy. In general, local
governments with more (less) revenue autonomy are also able to exert more (less) discretion
in their expenditure decisions, and this might translate into greater (lower) ability to tailor
the public service provision to the preferences of the community. Great differences in the
size of the tax base, therefore, might generate discontent and even confusion regarding the
importance of own revenue collections and, in general, the role of local governments in a
decentralized system.

The extent to which these conditions hold, or are adhered to in practice, is likely to vary
from one tax instrument to another. In general, it seems reasonable to expect that only some
taxes, if any, will satisfy all of them. For instance, there are few taxes that satisfy the benefit
principle and are not exportable, among which the property tax and the tax on vehicles stand as
the most typical examples. However, both the property tax and the tax on vehicles are subject to
7

Brennan and Buchanan (1980) suggest that tax competition has a corrective effect on the overall amount of public
expenditures, because it limits the natural tendency of governments to spend more than the efficient amount.
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tax competition, which can create economic inefficiencies and erode the tax bases. In addition, in
most cases the magnitude of the tax base varies significantly across jurisdictions, particularly
between urban and rural areas. In this sense, we can also expect a certain degree of correlation
between the size of the tax base and the administrative capacity of the local government, such
that the initial disparities are aggravated by the relative difficulties in raising local revenues.
All things considered, the property tax represents a promising but still imperfect source of
own revenues at the local level. Even with significant decentralization of the property tax, poorer
local governments will likely remain dependent on alternative sources of revenues, notably
intergovernmental transfers. In addition, special attention will be required to create a tradition of
taxpayers‟ participation and voluntary compliance, and to provide the right incentives for
efficient levels of tax effort by local governments.

3.2 The importance of tax revenue autonomy
The Decentralization Theorem (Oates 1972) states that if the decisions about the type and
amount of public goods are allowed to be made locally, then the level of social welfare would be
greater with respect to a situation where public goods are centrally, and uniformly, determined
for all localities. The reason is simply that the local governments are better able to tailor public
goods provision to the particular needs and preferences of each jurisdiction.8
In order to adapt the type and amount of public goods to the local needs and preferences
the local authorities require, by necessity, a certain degree of autonomy on their expenditure
decisions. But even if granted by law, the expenditure autonomy cannot be practiced without
sufficient technical and administrative capacity and the ability to discretionally increase the
amount of local revenues. The existence of effective expenditure and revenue autonomy is
widely recognized in the literature as a basic requirement for realizing the welfare gains of fiscal
decentralization. Unfortunately, this economic prescription does not always concur, and might
even collide with, the practical drivers of decentralization. The international movement towards
greater fiscal decentralization has responded more to political forces like the demand for deeper
democratization, the resolution of ethnic conflicts, or the failure of central governments in
securing national objectives, than to a search for greater economic efficiency as portrayed in the
Decentralization Theorem.9 In many countries the implementation of an economically efficient
decentralization design, although desirable, might well not be a priority.
According to Ahmad and Brosio (2008), one of the main factors weakening the
decentralization process in Latin America has been the lack of attention given to the sub-national
revenue assignments. In this context, it does not seem too audacious to suggest that the
8

Oates (2006) provides a more recent discussion about the Decentralization Theorem and the channels through
which fiscal decentralization can lead to net welfare gains for society.
9
See Shah (2004) for a discussion about the possible factors explaining the widespread decentralization movement
among developing and transition countries.
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widespread decentralization of the property tax is partially explained by the fact that the central
authorities have several more efficient, easier to administer, and less unpopular revenue sources
under their control. Similarly, central authorities are usually reluctant to devolve effective
autonomy to the sub-national governments in most areas of taxation. The reason for this may be
the lack of technical and administrative capacity at the sub-national level, but it is also
reasonable to presume that central authorities are not willing to renounce their power over
budgetary decisions.
In short, even though the choice of the property tax as a main source of local own
revenues seems to be correct from an economic perspective, the assignment of this revenue
source to the local governments by no means guarantees that local governments will be able to
exert expenditure autonomy in the margin and to realize the benefits of decentralization.

4. Explaining property tax collections: An analytical framework
The amount of property tax revenues that governments are able to collect varies widely
across nations and across jurisdictions within any country, and it depends on a wide range of
institutional, cultural, political and economic factors. The problem of property tax collections (or
the lack thereof) has been extensively analyzed in the economic literature. The complexities of
the problem and data limitations, however, still impose severe restrictions to the empirical
analyses; and as a result, no conclusive answers have been reached about the factors determining
property tax collections.
In this section we develop a model of property tax collections and show their dependency
on the concept of tax effort, and explain how the design and implementation of the fiscal
decentralization process can affect the performance of the property tax. We begin by presenting a
general model of revenue collections and then we analyze, separately, the revenue collection
problem at the sub-national and national levels.

4.1 A simple model of property tax collections
Following Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008), and assuming that the property value assessment
is based on market value, the amount of property tax collections ( ) can be defined as: 10
,

10

(1)

In the equality provided by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008) both sides of the identity are divided by the GDP.
By doing this, the tax collections are expressed in relative terms, thus the figures for different countries are
comparable and the analysis can be carried out in a cross sectional basis. This equality was previously presented, for
instance, in Bahl (1979).
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: property tax liability,
: taxable assessed value,
: taxable market value,
: full market value.

The first term on the right hand side, property tax collections over tax liability, corresponds to
the collection ratio. In the ideal case the amount of tax collections should be identical to the tax
liabilities and this term would be equal to one. In practice, however, either the tax authorities
might fail to properly enforce the tax law or the taxpayers might fail to comply with it; thus the
collection ratio is normally lower than one. The value of the collection ratio can be interpreted as
a measure of the observance of the tax law and the ability of the authorities to enforce it through
fines or even jail sentences. According to Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2008), a normal value for
the collection ratio in developing countries is around 50%, which is explained mainly due to lax
tax enforcement, and in some cases can even be as low as 20%.
The second term on the right hand side of equation 1, the share of tax liabilities over
taxable assessed value, is the statutory tax rate, usually set at some value lower than 1%. The
third term represents the assessment ratio, the share of taxable assessed value on taxable market
value, by which the law establishes the share of the taxable market value over which the tax
liability is actually going to be computed. When the assessment ratio is specified by law, then it
normally takes a value between zero and one, but if it is not specified, then its implicit value is
one. The assessment ratio is nothing more than an adjustment to the statutory tax rate and it is
used to induce acceptability of the tax system and reduce complaints about the assessment
criteria, because it gives the taxpayer the impression that he is not being taxed for the full value
of his property. 11 Finally, the fourth and fifth terms on the right hand side of equation 1 jointly
represent the tax base ( ) that is actually available for taxation. The fourth term is the ratio of
taxable market value over (full) market value, and summarizes all the effects of preferential
treatments, exemptions on the tax base, and errors in assessing the true market value of the
property (the last term in the equation). Equation 1 can now be rewritten as:
,
where

(2)

is the statutory tax rate “adjusted” by the assessment ratio.

As explained, the collection ratio measures the degree of observance of the tax law, and
can be different from one only in the presence of “distortions” imposed by the behavior of
government authorities or taxpayers. There are several possible sources of distortions that can
explain a low degree of observance of the tax law. On the government side, the tax law can be
deficiently enforced ( ) if the tax authorities are either unable or unwilling to capture the
11

If the collection ratio is assumed to be set at 1 by the tax authorities, then this term might still have a value
different from one, which could be interpreted as a deviation of the “true” market value of taxable properties due to
an inaccurate assessment of the value of taxable properties. In this framework, however, we assume that the market
value is correctly measured and that the collection ratio serves only as a policy instrument.

Explaining Property Tax Collections in Developing Countries: The Case of Latin America

15

whole revenue potential of the property tax. We might also be in the presence of corruption ( ),
in which case the tax authorities appropriate for themselves a share of the revenues collected.
On the taxpayers‟ side, revenues might be lost due to tax evasion ( ), generally defined
as any illegal form of taxpayers‟ non-compliance. 12 The traditional model of tax evasion
explains taxpayers‟ non-compliance by considering the probability of auditing and detection, the
cost of enforcement and the costs of non-compliance, which can be summarized under the
concept of penalties ( ). 13 In the case of the property tax, however, illegal non-compliance is
limited by the very nature of the tax base. If properties are immovable, then they cannot be easily
hidden from the tax authorities. As a result, tax evasion can take place only under certain
circumstances. For instance, the taxpayers might take advantage of the inability or unwillingness
of the tax authorities to correctly assess the value of the property, or might also attempt to lie in
order to qualify for preferential treatments and exemptions. In these cases the factor explaining
tax evasion is deficient enforcement. Alternatively, corrupt tax authorities might accept bribes
for reducing taxpayers‟ tax bills.
Another possible form of tax evasion consists of simply refusing to pay the tax liabilities.
This decision would be economically rational and even become a common practice, if taxpayers
perceive that the tax law is not enforced or if the costs of tax evasion are relatively low. In
contrast, if the tax law specifies high penalties and is being properly enforced, then tax evasion
would certainly be too costly and eventually lead to the expropriation of the property; thus it is
less likely that the taxpayers would choose this strategy.
The economic literature has recently incorporated the concept of tax morale ( ) in
order to account for the fact that taxpayers are usually inclined to voluntarily comply with the tax
law even in the absence of effective enforcement.14 Analyzing opinion survey data from the
United States and Turkey, Torgler et al (2008) find that positive attitudes towards the tax
authorities and the tax system as well as trust in public officials significantly increase tax morale,
while the perception of corruption has the opposite effect. Additionally, Torgler (2005a) shows
that the willingness to pay taxes increases with the level of direct democracy in a jurisdiction.
The evidence provided by the tax morale literature suggests, therefore, that tax evasion also
depends on the taxpayers‟ perception about the behavior and performance of the tax authorities,
and the extent to which they conform to the preferences of the community. In our model we
summarize these determinants of tax morale with the concepts of corruption and government
responsiveness ( ). Tax morale is expected to decrease (and tax evasion to increase) with a

12

The literature reserves the term “tax avoidance” to refer to any legal form of non-compliance. Tax avoidance
corresponds to the taxpayers‟ initiatives to minimize their tax burden by taking advantage of preferential treatments
and exemptions contemplated in the law. In this model, tax avoidance is accounted for as a reduction of taxable
market value of properties, and thus a reduction of the property tax base.
13
The basic structure of the tax traditional evasion model is developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and
Srinivasan (1973), and the cost of enforcement is incorporated by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987). Two surveys on the
theory of tax compliance are provided by Andreoni et al (1998) and Sandmo (2005).
14
A comprehensive review of the concept of tax morale and the relevant literature is provided by Torgler (2007).
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higher perception of corruption; and the opposite would occur if the tax authorities are truthfully
responsive to the preferences of the taxpayers.
Summarizing, tax evasion can be said to respond positively to deficient enforcement and
negatively to the size of penalties and tax morale, and we can write in shorthand that
. Furthermore, the amount of tax liabilities ( ) can be decomposed into the
observance of the tax law, represented by tax collections
, and the non-observance of the tax
law, represented by the tax revenues forgone due to deficient enforcement
, corruption , and
tax evasion :
.
Solving this equation for
and dividing by
the amount of tax collections as:

(3)

, we can introduce it into equation 2 to express

.

(4)

where tax collections appear to be a function of deficient enforcement, corruption, penalties of
tax evasion, government responsiveness, the adjusted statutory tax rate, and the size of the tax
base. The analytical advantage of equation 4 is that now tax collections are exclusively expressed
as a function of exogenous variables, which allows us to more easily identify the factors that
determine the actual amount of tax revenue collections.
The amount of taxes a government is able to collect largely depends on policy variables
that can be influenced either by the tax law or by the tax authorities. This conclusion stresses the
role of the tax laws and the responsible government authorities as opposed to the role of
taxpayers in explaining tax collections. A government in need of rising additional revenues is not
limited to legally determining the tax rate and the tax base. In reality, several alternative channels
might serve the same purpose. For instance, the tax law might incorporate measures to minimize
and sanction corruption, set adequate levels of penalties for evasion, and restrict preferential
treatments and exemptions. Alternatively, the tax authorities might choose to effectively enforce
the tax law, improve the assessment process in order to more accurately measure the tax base,
and to deepen the involvement of taxpayers in the public spending decisions. As De Cesare
(2002, p.11) points out in the context of a review of several independent experiences in Latin
America, “…it [is] clear that the political will is the principal element for explaining differences
in the performance of property taxes.”
So far the discussion about the basic determinants of tax collections has not distinguished
between the levels of government responsible to collect the property tax. This distinction is
important because different levels of government are given different responsibilities and decision
making powers, and also because typically they possess dissimilar levels of administrative
capacity. In principle, the more discretion a sub-national government is allowed, the greater the
influence it can exert on the variables determining the amount of tax collections. In any case,
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equation 4 also shows that even with limited power over the design of the tax policy a subnational government has a wide variety of channels available to alter the amount of tax
collections. Indeed, due to their proximity to the collection process and to the taxpayers, the subnational authorities could enjoy some advantages with respect to the central government.
Corruption, for instance, might be easier to detect and correct at the local level; and
strengthening the enforcement of the law and reducing tax evasion might well be facilitated by
enhancing the taxpayers‟ participation in local expenditure decisions. Although not conclusive,
the economic literature provides some evidence suggesting that fiscal decentralization reduces
the level of corruption in a country. When authorities enjoy a significant degree of autonomy
they not only have more ability to correct the distortions that reduce the level of tax collections,
but they also are more accountable to the community. 15

4.2 Comparing tax collection performance at the sub -national
level
A sub-national government responsible for collecting certain taxes would likely have some
degree of discretion over several, and maybe all, of the explanatory variables described in
equation 4. In this context, tax performance can be evaluated by comparing the amount of taxes
collected by different sub-national government under similar conditions. A good (poor) level of
performance would consist of collecting a relatively high (low) amount of tax revenues with
respect to other sub-national governments that face a comparable tax base and enjoy a similar
level of discretion.
The natural question is what amount of tax collections should be considered as the
benchmark to distinguish between good and poor performance. In principle, for each level of
government, the total amount of revenues raised should be able to cover all the expenditure
needs. Therefore, in a decentralized system of government the benchmarking amount of tax
collections can be defined, jointly for all tax instruments available, as the share of expenditure
needs that remain unfunded after the vertical imbalance has been corrected via intergovernmental
transfers. Unfortunately, this benchmark requires a precise measure of the vertical imbalance,
which in practice is difficult to obtain. A more feasible alternative is to set the benchmark at the
average effective tax rate, , such that any government whose effective tax rate is higher (lower)
than the average would be said to exert a relatively high (low) tax effort.16

15

See, for instance, Fisman and Gatti (2002) for an empirical analysis providing strong support to the hypothesis
that fiscal decentralization reduces corruption.
16
can be computed as the total amount of taxes actually collected among all government units divided by the
overall tax base. This definition corresponds to the weighted average of the effective tax rate for all government
units. A different alternative, not less convenient, consists of computing the benchmark as the simple average of the
effective tax rates for the available sample (of countries or sub-national governments). The weighted average will be
expected to be greater (smaller) than the simple average as long as per capita collections tend to increase (decrease)
with the jurisdiction size.
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Now we can multiply both the numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of
equation 4 by , and rewrite the equation to describe the tax collections of any jurisdiction as:
.

(5)

Notice that and are the only variables not determined inside the jurisdiction. In general, the
tax law assigns different responsibilities to the different levels of government, and authority over
variables like the penalties of tax evasion might be reserved to the central government or even be
an exclusive prerogative of the congress. Because of this reason the penalties of tax evasion as
well as any policy variables that are not under the authority of sub-national governments can be
considered to be determined exogenously.
On the right hand side of equation 5, the product of the terms inside the bracket and the
ratio of adjusted statutory tax rate over the average (benchmark) effective tax rate represents a
“relative effective tax rate,” which takes a value greater than, equal to or lower than one as long
as the tax rate effectively applied on the government unit is greater, equal or lower than the
sample average. This is precisely the definition of what the economic literature refers to as the
tax effort ( ) exerted by a particular government. Moreover, the product of the last two terms
in the equation, the average (benchmark) effective tax rate times the tax base of the government
unit , describes the concept of fiscal capacity ( ), which is usually defined as the amount of
tax revenues that could be collected if a given level of effort were applied to the available tax
base. Equation 5 can therefore be reduced to the following identity:
,

(6)

where the taxes collected by a government are defined as the amount of revenues obtained by
applying the level of effort exerted by that government to a “fair” measure of its potential tax
revenues.
By expressing the amount of tax collections as a function of the level of tax effort,
equation 6 stresses the fact that, given the size of the available tax base, and a certain degree of
fiscal autonomy, each sub-national government is largely responsible for the amount of taxes
actually collected within its jurisdiction. In this sense, tax effort is a choice variable that can be
altered by voluntary decisions of sub-national authorities and those of taxpayers, and therefore it
can be used as a measure of tax collection performance. Equation 6 implies that we can estimate
the tax effort of a sub-national government as the ratio of its actual tax collections over its fiscal
capacity:
.

(7)

In order to evaluate the performance of each sub-national government we only need to compare
its tax effort with the tax effort of the other sub-national governments of the same level.
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Moreover, since data about sub-national revenue collections are usually available for most
countries, the main challenge lies in estimating fiscal capacity.
A correct interpretation of the concept of tax effort requires a careful consideration of the
actual degree of fiscal autonomy enjoyed in each jurisdiction. If all sub-national governments
enjoy the same degree of (significant) fiscal autonomy, then a relatively high (low) level of fiscal
effort might simply suggest that the jurisdiction‟s residents are demanding a relatively large
(small) amount of sub-national services. Given that the efficiency gains of fiscal decentralization
arise from tailoring the provision of public services to the needs and preferences of each
community, then even a very low level of tax effort could be regarded as optimal. Indeed, if the
system of intergovernmental fiscal relations is properly functioning then there would be nothing
right (wrong) with a high (low) level of tax effort, and no reward (penalty) would be justified. In
practice, however, and especially in the initial states of a fiscal decentralization reform, subnational fiscal autonomy might be limited by several factors. For instance, there might not be a
longstanding tradition of taxpayers‟ contributions to the public sector, and thus taxpayers might
not be willing to voluntarily comply with the law and neither would the tax authorities be willing
to enforce it. Decentralization reform, in this sense, can actually imply a radical cultural change
for some communities. Another limitation, very common among poor jurisdictions, is that of the
lack of technical and administrative capacity to manage sub-national finances and collect the
taxes. A sub-national government cannot be expected to assess the tax base, compute the tax
liability and collect the taxes without proper means to carry out these functions. But this basic
contradiction is a rather common occurrence among sub-national governments in Latin America,
especially in the rural areas. In order to address this problem either an asymmetric
decentralization of public functions or central government assistance to develop adequate
capacity would be required.
Given that the factors limiting sub-national fiscal autonomy usually unevenly affect
different jurisdictions, the observed variations in tax effort and performance may no longer be
the result of sub-national choices. It follows that in order to make the sub-national authorities
(and the communities) fully liable for the differences in tax effort then they should enjoy equal,
or at least comparable, levels of effective fiscal autonomy.
In spite of this argument, in order to increase own revenue collections, some countries
decide to reward high tax effort with additional intergovernmental transfers, and sanction low tax
effort with no additional, or less, intergovernmental transfers. These incentives might serve as an
effective tool to encourage greater sub-national tax collections, but it is important to recognize
that they would plausibly lead to counterproductive results. The reason for this is very simple
and deals with the trade-off faced at the sub-national level between own revenue sources and
intergovernmental transfers. Assuming that there are no savings, the total amount of government
expenditures in public services ( ) is equal to own tax collections plus the amount received in
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the form of intergovernmental transfers ( ),17 thus for any sub-national government
write the budget constraint as:
,

we can
(8)

from which it is clear that sub-national expenditures can be expressed as a function of
intergovernmental transfers,
. Replacing
by its definition in equation 6, dividing
by fiscal capacity
and solving for the level of tax effort
, we find that:
,

(9)

such that the tax effort exerted by the sub-national government is equal to the difference
between the total amount of public expenditures and the intergovernmental transfers received,
over the fiscal capacity of the jurisdiction. In other words, tax effort corresponds to the extent to
which a sub-national government exhausts its own tax base.
According to equation 9 the direct effect of intergovernmental transfers, with a negative
sign, is to reduce tax effort. An additional effect, however, can be observed in the amount of
public goods and services provided. Considering fiscal capacity as exogenous, the net effect of
transfers on tax effort will depend on whether public expenditures will increase in a greater,
equal or lower proportion than the transfers received. As a consequence, the final effect of
intergovernmental transfers on tax effort will ultimately depend on the elasticity of public goods
provision with respect to a marginal increase of the sub-national budget. Jurisdictions where
public goods are elastic will respond to additional intergovernmental transfers by increasing the
level of tax effort, but those where public goods are inelastic, or comparatively less desirable,
will reduce their tax effort.18 This implies that, regardless of the level of fiscal autonomy of subnational governments, tax effort can certainly be affected by intergovernmental transfers.
This analysis might suggest that the final effect of intergovernmental transfers on tax
effort is efficient in the sense that it responds to the demand of public services within each
jurisdiction. However, this conclusion is not necessarily correct. The demand for public services
is affected by preferences and also by the quality of public services, and in turn this quality can
be expected to vary across jurisdictions. 19 Some local governments might not be able to provide
public services with desirable standards of quality, which would reduce their demand and the
17

Other sources of own revenue collections (e.g. fees and financial debt) are excluded, without loss of generality, in
order to simplify the analysis. Here we also disregard whether the intergovernmental transfers are earmarked or not,
but this does not alter the fact that any degree of discretion over own revenue collections translates into discretion
“in the margin” over the total amount of government expenditures.
18
As a corollary of this result we could say that if intergovernmental transfers increase, do not change, or decrease
tax effort in a jurisdiction, then the demand for public goods within that jurisdiction has been revealed to be elastic,
have unitary elasticity, or be inelastic.
19
Equation 10 corresponds to a strictly budgetary identity, but it can be modified in order to model the supply and
demand for sub-national public goods and services. The left hand side would have to incorporate a production
function describing the amount and quality of public goods and services, and in the right hand side the tax
collections would represent the willingness to pay for these outputs.
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resultant level of tax effort. The obvious equity problems that arise will have to be solved in
accordance with the national preferences for redistribution.

4.3 Estimating fiscal capacity of sub -national governments
For the most part, the empirical literature on the property tax has focused on measuring tax effort
at the sub-national level by considering fiscal capacity as an exogenous factor with respect to the
tax revenue performance of those sub-national units. The reason for this is that any exercise of
discretion implies a certain degree of responsibility and thus allows us to evaluate tax
performance on the basis of effective power over tax collections. In this sense, sub-national
governments are by presumption passive with respect to their fiscal capacity and this concept can
be regarded as irrelevant for performance evaluations.
In the previous discussion we showed, however, that a good measure of fiscal capacity is
critical to accurately estimate the tax effort and evaluate their tax performance. Measuring the
fiscal capacity with respect to the property tax is particularly difficult because of the great
financial, technical and administrative requirements for developing comprehensive cadastres of
immovable properties. Any measure other than the cadastre, and independent from the actual
value of properties, will provide a questionable estimation of the potential property tax base.
Unfortunately, developing countries struggle with the complexity and costs associated
with the construction of the cadastre, but still the prospect of not taxing properties seems to be a
much worse solution. In practice, the use of indirect methodologies for estimating the fiscal
capacity associated with the property tax can help to partially solve this problem. The literature
has described a number of these methodologies, which have been designed to do as much as the
availability of information allows.
One of the simplest methodologies consists of using historical property tax collections
from one or several past periods. This methodology assumes that past collections can be
representative of the fiscal capacity of local governments. However, there are several factors that
might create a difference between potential and actual tax collections. The presence of centrally
imposed exemptions eroding the tax base, or greater administrative and compliance costs, and
the taxpayers‟ willingness to contribute to the provision of public goods, are some examples of
factors that might truly reduce fiscal disparities. But historically low tax collections might also
be caused by inefficiency, political favors and corruption. In this context, it is desirable to have
some information about the determinants of fiscal capacity. For instance, we might expect that
measures of income, production or consumption could be related to the size of the tax base,
including the property tax base. In general, the use of this type of “proxies” is preferable to the
use of historical data, but in developing countries we can rarely count on this information at the
local level.
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There are several additional methodologies for estimating fiscal capacity and their
usefulness, of course, depend on whether the data is available or not. 20 In any case, it is
important to stress the fact that deficient measures of fiscal capacity lead, necessarily, to equally
deficient estimates of tax effort.

4.4 Comparing tax collection performance across countries
The comparison of property tax performance across countries follows the same logic as the
comparison of sub-national tax performance. Maybe the most important difference consists of
which institutions are ultimately responsible for the relative variations in tax performance. In the
analysis of sub-national tax collections, sub-national governments are responsible for their
performance up to the point where they do not have further discretion to affect tax collections.
Such a limit is imposed, for instance, by the tax law, which can usually be regarded as exogenous
for any sub-national government and even for the central government. In contrast, regardless of
which level of government is responsible for administering a tax source, at the country level the
tax law and the public policies in general should be considered as endogenous and other national
institutions like the congress and the judiciary system also become responsible for the resultant
level of national tax performance.
In this cross country context, most of the variables determining property tax collections
can be considered to be endogenous, and we can define the total amount of tax collections for
any country as:
,

(10)

where besides the change in subscripts the only difference with respect to the sub-national case is
that the penalties for tax evasion (as well as any other determinant that might be exogenously
imposed by the tax law) are expressed as endogenous (choice) variables. 21
Moreover, provided the market value of all land and structures ( ) available for taxation
in the national territory, a country has full discretion to define the tax base, and in this sense the
share of the tax base over
becomes by itself a component of the national tax effort. As a
consequence, the country has discretion over all the variables in the right hand side of the
equation, and tax effort can be defined simply as:
20

For a review and an extensive discussion about the alternative methodologies available to measure fiscal capacity
see, for instance, Boex and Martinez-Vazquez (2007) and United States Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (1986).
21
One might argue that foreign tax policies also affect tax collections because they can induce the taxpayers to
emigrate in order to capitalize on tax advantages. This is especially relevant in cases where taxpayers are very
mobile, like corporations. In any case, mobility is fully accounted for in this equation by a decrease in the size of the
tax base. Another way in which foreign tax policies may also affect tax collections is through spatial tax competition
across countries. In this case tax rates and other policies set in foreign countries can affect the tax policy choice in
any one country.
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(11)

This equation states that national tax effort can be estimated as the ratio between actual tax
collections and the market value of lands and structures available for taxation within a country,
while the last term determines the potential tax collections or fiscal capacity of the country. In
turn, cross-country comparisons can be carried out by simply comparing the values of national
tax effort.
Of course, the same as in the case of sub-national tax performance, the main challenge
with estimating national tax effort is measuring the fiscal capacity of the country. If this is
possible, however, the cross-country analysis of tax effort and performance offers important
advantages in terms of data availability, because much more data about institutional, political,
cultural and economic variables are available at the country level.
Given that each country defines its own property tax base and might use different
valuation methods to estimate the taxable tax base, a wide variation of financial and technical
arrangements can be observed among different countries. As a consequence, even if available,
national estimates of the property tax base are not comparable. Bahl and Wallace (2008) suggest
a standardized approach in order to solve this problem: The measures of national wealth
provided by the World Bank (2006) can be used to estimate the size of the potential property tax
base under a single criterion and for a large number of countries. In Appendix II we present the
estimates of the potential property tax bases for a number of the Latin American countries.
Unfortunately, the measures of national wealth are currently available only for the year 2000;
thus even if useful, they do not provide information about how tax bases vary across time. In the
next section we use these estimates in the econometric analysis of international property tax
performance.

5. The determinants of property tax collections in Latin-America
An empirical test of the main propositions of our analysis requires information that, in
general, is not available at the sub-national level in Latin American countries, so we are not able
to properly account for the determinants of property tax collections at the within-country level.
For this reason, we begin with a simple OLS regression analysis in order to verify how
intergovernmental transfers received by local governments in Brazil and Peru (in national
currency) are correlated with per capita property tax collections. 22
The results are presented in Table 4. Because of data availability, we are able to include
only a few other control variables to get a clearer picture of the potential impact of
22

The choice of these countries responds to data availability. Both Brazil and Peru provide public information about
sub-national finances and basic demographic and development indicators. The main data sources are the National
Treasure of Brazil and the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru.
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intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These control variables are the total
amount of current revenues in each jurisdiction, revenue autonomy (defined as own taxes over
total revenues), population, regional GDP in the case of Brazil, and the relative incidence of
poverty and the percent of urban population in the case of Peru. We should also note that total
current revenues and revenue autonomy should be expected to be endogenous with property tax
collections; however, lacking valid instruments we cannot correct this problem. Still, a few
interesting observations may be drawn from the results.
The most relevant result in Table 4 is that current intergovernmental transfers per capita
are negatively and significantly correlated with property tax collections per capita in Brazil and
Peru. This would seem to suggest that on average current transfers act as a disincentive for
property tax collections. However, we need to interpret this result with caution. There may be an
endogeneity bias in these estimates because lower property tax revenues per capita may also
induce larger current intergovernmental transfers per capita. On the other hand, the coefficients
of capital intergovernmental transfers are not statiscally significant, suggesting that the
distribution of this revenue source because of its unpredictability or periodicity does not affect
local property tax collection performance.

Table 4: Determinants of Property Tax Collections in Brazil and Peru
Dependent variable: Per capita property tax collections

Current transfers per capita
Capital transfers per capita
Current revenues per capita

OLS regression

OLS regression

Brazil

Peru

-0.1124 ***

(0.0130)

0.0058

-0.0080

(0.0063)

(0.0191)

0.1081 ***
(0.0223)

Revenue autonomy (%)

2.5051 ***
(64.9611)

Per capita GDP (2000)

-0.2263 ***

(0.0237)

0.2165 ***
(0.0123)

1.6772 ***
(49.8014)

-0.0006 **
(0.0003)

Poverty

0.0097
(0.0427)

Urban population (%)

-0.1065 ***
(0.0390)

Population (thousands)

-0.0015

-0.1159 ***

(0.0047)

(0.0439)

Constant

-8.7593 ***

Observations
R-squared

6.6278

(3.3112)

(4.0486)

4,998

1,428

0. 5218

0.8769

Notes: Robust standard errors of in parentheses.
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

The coefficients of total current revenues and revenue autonomy are positive and
statistically significant. But these results are expected due to the construction of those variables;
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by definition the larger the property tax collections the larger will be the amount of current
revenues as well as the share of own revenues in the local budgets. However, they might also
suggest, subject again to a possible endogeneity bias, that local governments with larger budgets
and more revenue autonomy might be better able to collect property taxes.
The regressions also include proxies for local fiscal capacity, which help to estimate the
relative size of the property tax base as well as the administrative capacity of local governments.
The per capita GDP variable is available for Brazilian local governments. Its coefficient is
negative and significant at the 5% confidence level. This result is contrary to our expectations, as
long as GDP per capita is expected to be highly correlated with the property tax base; but it could
also be that a higher GDP per capita signals the availability of other tax bases, such as Brazil‟s
ISS (local tax on services), which is relatively more important than the property tax in local
budgets. The availability of other tax sources may push down local efforts to collect the more
difficult and unpopular property tax. 23 However, we must note that the estimated coefficient is
relatively unimportant in terms of magnitude, implying that property tax collections are not that
responsive to this factor. In the case of Peru there are no measures of GDP al the local level.
Instead, we use a measure of poverty defined as the share of the population under the poverty
line; this variable displays no significant correlation with property taxes. In addition, we consider
the share of the population living in urban areas, which is expected to be directly related with the
size of the property tax base.; however, here again the coefficient is instead negative and
statistically significant, perhaps signaling the availability of other more „convenient‟ revenue
sources in urban areas.
Finally, the regressions also include population as a control for the jurisdiction size. In
both cases the coefficient is negative, but it is significant only for Peruvian municipalities. This
is somewhat surprising because we would expect to observe economies of scale in property tax
collections. However, this result might be explained, for instance, by the presence of economies
of scale in the expenditure side; or alternatively; by a positive correlation between the extent of
informal properties and the jurisdictional size.
The empirical analysis of property tax collections at the local level is still subject to very
important data limitations, and the inability to properly control for other determinants can easily
lead to significant omitted variable bias. In contrast, even though at the international level the
data are also limited, there are several additional variables that allow us to control for
macroeconomic, political and institutional factors that are relevant in determining property tax
collections. In the end, however, there is a clear tradeoff since using international cross-country
data is also subject to aggregation biases and omitted country fixed effects.
The cross-country analysis of the determinants of property tax collections considers 9
Latin American countries for which relevant data are partially available for the period 19902007. These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México,
23

A similar result is found in the analysis of property tax collections at the international level, which is presented
later in this section, and where we discuss in more detail about possible interpretations.

26

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Paraguay, and Peru. The dependent variable, property tax collections, is defined as the share of
property tax collections in GDP. Based on the discussion in the previous section, we expect
property tax collections to decrease with deficient enforcement, corruption, tax evasion and the
predominance of transfers; and to increase with the size of the property tax base, government
responsiveness, and the average tax rate. Even though there are direct measures of all these
variables, some of them are not available for long periods of time for all Latin American
countries. In order to maximize the number of observations, we use alternative (more common)
variables as proxies of our variables of interest.
We consider a variety of factors accounting for the design of fiscal arrangements, the
level of development, the size of the property tax base, relevant differences in the
implementation of the property tax, and basic characteristics of the political system. 24 The
structure of fiscal arrangements is described through measures of fiscal decentralization, the
level of transfer dependency, and the size of government. Fiscal decentralization is defined as the
share of sub-national expenditures over total government expenditures, and it is used to represent
the extent of the fiscal devolution to the sub-national governments. 25 The dependency on
transfers is defined as the share of intergovernmental transfers in total sub-national revenues. As
explained, intergovernmental transfers reduce the need for collecting own revenues and,
therefore, might reduce tax effort and the collections of the property tax. Finally, government
size is used to account for the relative magnitude and relevancy of the public sector and its
components, including transfer programs, in the overall economy.
The level of development is represented by the per capita GDP. This variable provides
information, among other things, on the levels of accumulated physical and human capital. For
example, local governments in richer countries might have access to highly skilled personnel and
more sophisticated equipment, so that their ability to administer and collect taxes is greater than
that of less developed countries. Still, different levels of development can also be related with
diverse patterns of sub-national governments‟ financing, and thus the sign of the influence on
property tax collections remains uncertain.
Property tax collections also depend on the value of land and structures in a country,
which accounts for the potential property tax base. We approximate this value, following Bahl
and Wallace (2008), with estimations computed on the basis of national wealth data provided by
the World Bank (2006). 26 We also control for the share of the urban population, because the size
and composition of the tax base as well as the amount of property tax collections can be expected
to be quite different in rural and urban areas. In addition, we include two dummy variables to
control for the specific characteristics of Chile, where the administration and the authority over
24

The description and sources of the variables used in the analysis, as well as the summary statistic, are presented in
Appendixes III and IV, respectively.
25
Even thought this variable does not capture the effective autonomy of sub-national government, lacking any better
option we follow the most common practice in the decentralization literature and use this variable to proxy for the
level of fiscal decentralization.
26
See Appendix II.
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the property tax remain fully centralized; and of Ecuador and Mexico, the only countries in the
sample where the cadastre is developed by the sub-national governments. 27
In practice, sub-national governments can effectively enjoy additional fiscal autonomy
only if the decentralization process also enhances the political representation of the population.
Indeed, the share of local government expenditure over total government expenditures does not
say much about the ability of taxpayers to choose their representatives and express their
preferences for public goods, which, in turn, determines the extent of effective accountability of
government officials and the degree of responsiveness to taxpayers‟ preferences. In order to
account for these factors we consider two variables; the competition for public positions and an
index of democracy. The degree of competition for public positions, we argue, serves to limit the
ability of local authorities to take advantage of their political power, and thus helps to increase
accountability and to contain corruption. Complementarily, the index of democracy serves to
represent the ability of taxpayers to truly express their preferences.
Table 5 presents the results of our empirical analysis. The first regression (1) uses a fixed
effects model in order to control in the estimation for all unobserved specific-country
characteristics. As we might expect, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. A greater devolution of expenditure responsibilities to
sub-national governments requires relatively more revenues, providing incentives for greater
property tax collections. The coefficient for the dependency on transfers takes a negative sign,
and thus is negatively related to property tax collections, and it is statistically significant at the
5% level. This result is important because it supports our conjecture that the predominance of
transfers can have a negative effect on tax effort. In order to control for the relative magnitude of
intergovernmental transfers we also include an interaction term between transfers and the size of
the (general) government with respect to the GDP. The coefficient of this variable is positive and
significant, suggesting that the negative effect of transfers of property tax collections is reduced
as the size of the government increases. A bigger public sector might need to count on other
(than property) tax sources, and might also be better able to improve tax administration at every
level and to implement “non-distorting” or “incentive-neutral” transfer programs. On average,
the net effect of transfers on property tax collections becomes positive when the size of the
public sector corresponds to 17.7% of the economy (displayed at the bottom of Table 5).
The level of development, represented by the GDP per capita, has a negative effect on
property tax collections; which is significant at the 1% level. This result might appear as
counterintuitive, because a greater level of development is usually associated not only with
improved tax bases and administrative and tax collection capacity, but also with greater ability
(and maybe willingness) to pay property taxes. An alternative explanation of this result would go
along the same lines discussed above for the case of Brazil; higher GDP per capita my signal the
availability of other tax sources of some significance and therefore a relative decrease in the
reliance on property taxes as a source of local revenue. A simple analysis of the sub-national tax
27

See Appendix I.
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mix and GDP per capita would seem to point in that direction; Figure 1(a) plots property tax
collections as a share of sub-national taxes against GDP per capita. There appears to be a clear
negative relationship between these variables, suggesting that the relative importance of the
property in sub-national governments‟ financing decreases as the country GDP per capita
increases. 28
Finally, among the other controls only competition for public positions and the index of
democracy are statistically significant. As expected, the variable used to represent accountability
and the limits to corruption –competition for public positions, is positively related with property
tax collections. In contrast, the coefficient of the index of democracy has a negative sign;
suggesting that the property tax might not enjoy political acceptability. 29
The second column of Table 5 presents the results of a random effects model in which we
are able to include time-constant variables and at the same time partially controlling for countryspecific effects. The results under this specification are fairly consistent with the findings under
fixed effects, but all controls are now significant at the 1% level. In particular, government size
and the percentage of urban population appear to be negatively correlated with property tax
collections.
The time-invariant variables that are included in this estimation are (the logarithm of) the
estimated size of the potential tax base, a dummy that takes the value of one for Chile, and a
dummy that assigns a value of one to the two countries of the sample in which the cadastre is
developed locally, Ecuador and Mexico. The signs of the coefficients of the time-constant
variables are in line with our expectations. The greater the size of the potential tax base the
greater the relative amount of property tax collections. 30 On the other hand, Ecuador and Mexico
appear as collecting fewer taxes due to the reliance on, presumably ill-equipped, sub-national tax
administration; and Chile performs better that the average of the sample due the opposite reason.
Regression (3) in Table 5 introduces the square of the GDP per capita in order to allow
for a non-linear influence on property tax collections. The general results do not significantly
differ from the previous regression, and the square of the GDP per capita is positive and
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The data for Chile, within the oval in Figure 1(a), exhibits a distinctive pattern, which has been accounted for by
the country dummy in the econometric specification.
29
In order to account for additional country specific characteristics we also considered regional disparities in GDP
per capita as an additional control variable. The correlation between this variable and property tax collections as a
share of the GDP is -0.686, suggesting that countries with greater regional disparities tend to collect fewer property
taxes. However, we do not present the results for this variable because its inclusion in the estimating equations
drastically reduces the number of observations.
30
The explicit consideration of the potential tax base might also help to explain the negative sign of the urban
population‟s coefficient. Once the size of the tax base has been accounted for, a negative relationship between urban
population and property tax collections might suggest that urban areas concentrate more unregistered properties and
exempted taxpayers than is the case in rural areas.
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Table 5: Determinants of Property Tax Collections
Dependent variable: Property tax collections (PTC) as a share of the GDP

Fiscal Decentralization (%)
Dependency on Transfers (%)
Interaction term
(Dep.on Transfers. Government size)

Government Size (% GDP)
Log of per capita GDP

Fixed Effects

Random Effects

Random Effects

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.00919 ***

0.01617 ***

0.01445 ***

Random Effects
IV a
(4)
0.03038 ***

(0.00242)

(0.00150)

(0.00135)

(0.00637)

-0.01047 **

-0.01053 ***

-0.00502 **

-0.02031 ***

(0.00509)

(0.00234)

(0.00255)

(0.00697)

0.00059 **

0.00072 ***

0.00043 ***

0.00086 ***

(0.00028)

(0.00014)

(0.00015)

(0.00029)

-0.01288

-0.02731 ***

-0.00776

-0.04679 **

(0.01554)

(0.00901)

(0.00952)

(0.01991)

-0.17295 ***

-0.28330 ***

-2.65021 ***

-0.10259

(0.04730)

(0.05883)

(0.84908)

(0.11616)

Log of per capita GDP squared

0.12901 ***
(0.04562)

Log of estimated property tax base

0.27237 ***

0.26629 ***

0.40590 ***

(0.02755)

(0.02683)

(0.08117)

0.00438

-0.01564 ***

-0.01050 ***

-0.04710 ***

(0.00743)

(0.00280)

(0.00326)

(0.01429)

-0.35632 ***

-0.36153 ***

-0.33473 ***

(0.02223)

(0.02096)

(0.05178)

0.85010 ***

0.83174 ***

1.17456 ***

(0.05660)

(0.05267)

(0.16223)

(as computed in Appendix II)

Urban population (%)
Municipal cadastre (dummy)
Chile (dummy)
Competition for public positions
Index of democracy
Constant
Observations
Number of countries
R-squared within
R-squared between
R-squared overall

0.09501 ***

0.12712 ***

0.12667 ***

0.14642 ***

(0.02422)

(0.02600)

(0.02439)

(0.04218)

-0.03259 ***

-0.05281 ***

-0.05330 ***

-0.08504 ***

(0.00727)

(0.00804)

(0.00702)

(0.01904)

1.68607 ***

3.53144 ***

13.66880 ***

4.51384 ***

(0.63587)

(0.45747)

(3.72743)

(0.74078)

115
9

115
9

115
9

115
9

0.5913
0.1392
0.1288

0.4667
0.9795
0.9332

0.4487
0.9921
0.9396

0.1603
0.9252
0.8367

Test of overidentifying restrictions
p-value

0.233
0.6294

The mg. effect of GDP on PTC turns
positive when GDP per capita is:
The mg. effect of Transfers on PTC turns
positive when government size is:
a

28,892
17.7

14.6

11.7

23.6

The instrumented variables are Fiscal Decentralization, Dependency on Transfers, and the interaction term between the later and
Government Size. The instruments are log of population, political competition, openness to international trade and the price level of
government expenditures.
Notes: Robust standard errors of in parentheses.
All regressions include time periods‟ dummies (not shown)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

statistically significant at the 1% level; implying that the negative marginal effect of
development on property tax collection decreases with per capita GDP.31

31

The average effect of development on property tax collections turns out to be positive when the GDP per capita is
US$28,892. That point, however, is irrelevant because no country in the sample reaches that value.
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A relevant concern about the econometric specification is the existence of an endogenous
relationship between some of the explanatory variables and property tax collections. In particular
we may expect a certain degree of reverse causality; that is, we can expect the extent of fiscal
decentralization and the amount of transfers to be influenced by the level of property tax
collections. In order to address this problem, in regression (4) we use a Generalized Two-stage
Least Squares (G2SLS) random effects model, where we introduce instrumental variables (IV) to
correct possible biases in the estimators. The instrumented variables are fiscal decentralization,
dependency on transfers, and the interaction term between dependency on transfers and the size
of government. As instruments we choose the log of population, the degree of political (party)
competition, openness to international trade and the price level of government expenditures. 32
The set of instruments is highly correlated with the three endogenous variables but uncorrelated
with property tax collections. Moreover, the test of over-identifying restrictions (in the table)
fails to reject the null that the set of excluded variables are valid instruments. 33 In general,
although the magnitude of the coefficients exhibit relevant corrections, their signs and statistical
significance remain roughly unaffected. 34
Summarizing, property tax revenue performance improves with the extent of fiscal
decentralization, the presence of accountability mechanisms, and the size of the potential tax
base. In contrast, tax collections decrease with the index of democracy, higher dependency on
transfers, and the fact that the cadastre is administered locally.
Finally, a variable that we have considered as a potentially important determinant of
property tax collections is the perception of corruption, which even if available, has been
excluded from the econometric analysis due to the small number of observations. Figure 1(b)
presents a scatter plot where we verify an apparent correlation between property tax collections
as a share of GDP and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The Corruption Perceptions Index
assigns a greater value to those countries that are less corrupt, thus the positively sloped trend
line suggests that less corrupt countries are, in average, able to collect more property taxes. 35
This analysis provides important insights about the determinants of property tax
collections in Latin America. In principle, given that we do not have information about what the
“correct” level of property tax collections is, we cannot say a priori whether increasing tax
collections is a desirable thing. However, it is well known that Latin American countries perform
below international standards, and since we have no reason to presume that their sub-national
expenditure needs are particularly low, then we can conclude that certain factors have an
excessively (undesirable) negative influence on property tax collections. The dependency on
32

See Appendixes III and IV for a description of the variables used and summary statistics.
The test of over-identifying restrictions was developed for Stata by Schaffer and Stillman (2006).
34
The only exception is the level of development, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. We cannot know,
however, if this change is due to the correction of a bias or due to possible collinearity introduced by the
instrumentation for the endogenous variables.
35
The Corruption Perceptions Index is prepared by Transparency International, and the data can be retrieved from
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
33
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Figure 1: Relationship of property tax collections with GDP per capita and corruption
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transfers and local responsibility for the implementation of the cadastre are two relevant factors
in reducing property tax collections and over which the authorities might have some degree of
control. For instance, the design of the fiscal decentralization might incorporate new sub-national
own-revenue sources, such that the local authorities and their constituencies internalize the value
of revenue autonomy and start exercising higher tax effort in order to finance expanded local
services. Still, greater autonomy at the local level does not mean that complex, long-lasting and
expensive tasks like building a complete cadastre of properties can be undertaken without
assistance from the central government. The movement towards greater revenue collections and
autonomy, especially in developing countries, must be gradual, with a central government that is
able to support and assist local administrations in their transition to more decentralized and
efficient arrangements.

6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Successful decentralization in terms of efficiency and fiscal responsibility depends
critically on the provision of adequate revenue autonomy to sub-national governments. The
property tax is widely considered as the most appropriate instrument to promote tax autonomy at
the local level, while other taxes such as vehicle taxes, local excise, piggyback personal income
taxes, or business permit taxes should also play an important role in the promotion of local tax
autonomy. Still, it is difficult to argue strongly for greater property tax autonomy when many
local governments in Latin America appear not to be taking advantage of the autonomy that is
currently granted in the laws. An important piece of any potential indictment is that, judging
from what is collected in other regions of the world; actual property tax collections in the region
are a small fraction of what appears to be the revenue potential. In this context, any attempts to
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achieve more efficient forms of decentralization in the Latin America region via increased
revenue autonomy for local governments would need to grapple with the question of how to
achieve significant improvement in local property tax collections.
Property tax collections are determined by a wide array of factors. These factors include,
among others, the extent or depth of fiscal decentralization reforms, the structure of sub-national
financing, the level of development, the potential size of the property tax base, and basic
institutional characteristics of the public sector. In particular, we find that the predominance of
intergovernmental transfers in the sub-national finance systems have a negative effect on
property tax collections and that, for the most part, sub-national governments in Latin America
are unwilling or do not seem capable of taking advantage of the devolution of this revenue
source. In this context, getting the property tax to perform rightly may take more than just
addressing the issues, complex on their own, of designing, administering and enforcing the
property tax itself. For instance, we argue that government responsiveness towards taxpayers‟
needs and improvements in cultural factors like tax morale might be necessary to increase
property tax collections.
Effective devolution of the property tax to sub-national governments should be
accompanied by certain preconditions. Some of these preconditions are not currently met by
some Latin American countries, and thus provide a good starting point to draw meaningful
policy recommendations to guide future reforms. Of course, country circumstances and
conditions differ, so not all recommendations should be expected to apply to each case.
There is a clear need for most local governments to develop their administrative and
technical capacities. This rather obvious recommendation has for long been recognized in the
literature, but it remains as an unavoidable and pending task. Two possible strategies to move
forward in this regard are the implementation of asymmetric property tax assignments and the
provision of technical and financial assistance to those local governments with lower
administrative capacity. Moreover, improving the performance of the property tax in the region
would also benefit from strengthening institutions and re-shaping cultural attitudes. In particular,
it is necessary to make local authorities understand the importance of own tax revenues and to
show the taxpayers the connection between property tax payments and local services. This will
not be an easy task, but successful experiences such as those provided by the cities of Bogota and
Lima might serve as relevant examples. 36 Finally, some reforms to the intergovernmental
finance system may be necessary. It is particularly important to correct the incentives provided
by the system of transfers. In this paper we provide some evidence of a potential negative effect
of intergovernmental transfers on property tax collections. These issues still need to be carefully
investigated.
Overall, and somewhat paradoxically, greater revenue autonomy for Latin American
local governments in the form of a more effective use of the property tax might depend in some
36

See Martinez-Vazquez (2010).
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cases on a deeper involvement of the central government in the administration, collection and
enforcement of the property tax. Making property taxes work more effectively in Latin America
will continue to be a complex challenge and no simple „silver bullet‟ simple solutions are in
sight. Attention must be given to “internal” factors, including issues of administration and local
capacity, but equal attention must be also given to an array of factors that are “external” to the
property tax collection process itself.
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Main characteristics of property tax systems in Latin America
Administration
Billing and collection
Appeals

Revenue
assignment

Authority to change the tax
structure

Cadastre

Provincial and
local govs.

Provincial and local
governments

Cadastral office

Provincial and local
governments

Bolivia

Municipal
governments

Dirección Nacional de
Catastro Urbano

Municipal Governments

Market Value

Brazil

Central (rural)
and municipal
(urban) govs.
Municipal
governments

Central gov. (Ministerio de
Finanzas) along with municipal
governments
Central and Municipal
Governments

Central (rural) and
municipal (urban) govs.

Municipal Governments

Market Value

Servicios de Impuestos
Internos(SII)

Central government
(Treasury)

Area by location for
land, construction
value for buildings

Argentina

Chile

Colombia

Municipal
governments

Costa Rica

Municipal
governments

Ecuador

Municipal
governments

Guatemala

Central and
municipal
governments

Honduras
Mexico

Central Government

National Congress defines tax
base and rate. A range of rates
is established within which
municips. are free to choose

Formal appeal
processes at both
government levels

Internal Tax Service,
Special Appeals Court
on Property Valuation,
Supreme Court
Instituto Geográfico Agustín Municipal governments
Cadastral Division,
Codazzi (IGAC)
(Secretarias de Hacienda)
petition tax
administration

Assessment

Market Value

Market Value

Municipal governments
(Catastro Nacional)

Municipal governments

Market Value

Central gov. along with
Municipalities‟ ability to set
rates
Central and Municipal
governments

Municipal governments

Municipal governments

Market Value

Central government
(Dirección General de
Catastro)

Market Value

Municipal
governments

Municipal governments

Municipal governments

Mainly Central gov.,
except for municipalities
with technical and
administrative capacity
Municipal governments

Municipal
governments

State and municipal
governments jointly

Municipal governments

Local governments
(Local Treasury
Offices)

Fiscal authority
judicial branch

Market Value, use of
the land, location and
improvements
Market value

(continued…)
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Administration
Billing and collection
Appeals

Country

Revenue
assignment

Authority to change the tax
structure

Cadastre

Nicaragua

Municipal
governments

Central government with
Municipalities‟ ability to grant
additional exemptions
Central and Provincial
governments
Central government
(Ministerio de Finanzas
Públicas)

Comisión Nacional de
Catastro

Municipal governments

Central government

Provincial governments

Mainly central gov.,
except for those
municips. with technical
and adm. capacity
Central government
[Comisión Nacional de
Tasaciones (CONATA)]
Central government
(Dirección General del
Catastro Nacional)
Central gov. (rural;
Dirección Nacional de
Catastro) and
Departments (urban)
Municipal governments

Municipal governments

Market Value

Municipal and District
governments

Market Value

Central government

Value greater than
approximately
US$150,000
Market Value plus
additional 20% for
improvements the
rural cases
Market Value

Panama
Paraguay

Peru
Dominican
Republic

Central
government
Municipal
governments
and
Departments
Municipal and
District
governments
Central
government

Central, Municipal and
District governments
Central government

Uruguay

Departments

Central and Municipal
government, along with
Departments

Venezuela

Municipal
governments

Municipal governments

Source: Martinez-Vazquez, Noiset and Rider (2010).

Departments

Municipal governments

Assessment
Cadastral value
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Appendix II: Estimates of potential property tax base by country and region, 2000
(in US$ per capita)
R
e
g
i
o
n
SA
CA
SA
SA
SA
SA
CA
SA
CA
CA
SA
CA
NA
CA
CA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA

Potential rural tax base

Potential
urban tax base

Potential
base of the
property tax

Cropland

Pastureland

Cropland +
Pasteurland

Urban land +
Structures *

Latin America
Argentina
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Guyana
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela, R.B. de

3,632
5,201
1,550
1,998
2,443
1,911
5,811
5,263
404
1,697
5,324
1,189
1,195
867
3,256
2,193
1,480
2,113
3,621
1,086

2,754
133
541
1,311
1,001
978
1,310
1,065
395
218
252
595
721
410
664
1,215
341
210
5,549
581

6,386
5,334
2,091
3,309
3,444
2,889
7,121
6,328
799
1,915
5,576
1,784
1,916
1,277
3,920
3,408
1,821
2,323
9,170
1,667

18,301
9,298
2,021
9,234
10,235
4,665
7,989
2,721
3,935
2,967
3,192
2,934
18,155
1,646
10,551
4,290
5,326
5,571
10,330
13,049

24,687
14,632
4,112
12,543
13,679
7,554
15,110
9,049
4,734
4,882
8,768
4,718
20,071
2,923
14,471
7,698
7,147
7,894
19,500
14,716

The Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Grenada
Haiti
Jamaica
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Trinidad and Tobago

1,003
190
5,274
1,980
572
668
824
0
3,394
2,106
444

468
210
553
386
67
112
152
0
108
109
54

1,471
400
5,827
2,366
639
780
976
0
3,502
2,215
498

37,151
17,398
14,661
5,480
15,444
576
9,723
34,197
13,018
10,041
13,871

38,622
17,798
20,488
7,846
16,083
1,356
10,699
34,197
16,520
12,256
14,369

1,973

1,114

3,086

10,608

13,695

1,848
1,983

493
1,164

2,342
3,147

4,116
11,137

6,458
14,284

1,232

226

1,458

5,139

6,596

Country

Regional averages
Latin America
Central America (CA)
South and North America (SA and NA)

The Caribbean

Source: World Bank (2006)
* As computed by Roy & Wallace, 2008. The tax base reported by the WB includes other produced capital that we would
not tax (durable goods for example). The WB report follows Kunte (1998), who assumes that urban land corresponds to
33% of the value of structures and, in turn, that structures correspond to 72% of the value of total capital.
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Appendix III: Variable description and data sources

Variable

Description and sources

Property tax collections

Share of property tax collections over GDP (in percentage).
Source: ECLAC.

Fiscal Decentralization

Share of sub-national expenditures over total government expenditures (in percentage).
Source: ECLAC.

Dependency on
Transfers

Share of intergovernmental transfers over total sub-national revenues (in percentage).
Source: ECLAC.

Government size

Government share of real GDP per capita (in percentage).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009).

Log of per capita GDP

Based on per capita real GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity, PPP).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009).

Log of estimated
property tax base

Based on the sum of the potential property tax base for rural and urban areas, as
computed in Appendix II with data from World Bank (2006). Figures correspond to
year 2000, and are expressed on $US per capita.

Urban population

Share of the total population living in urban areas (in percentage).
Source: World Development Indicators.

Competition for public
positions

Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment: Extent to which subordinates enjoy equal
opportunities to become superordinates.
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

Index of democracy

POLITY2 is a modified version of the POLITY, which is obtained by subtracting the
value of the scaled value representing AUTOCRATIC (range 0-10) from the value of
DEMOCRATIC (range 0-10) in order to provide a unified polity scale ranging from
+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

Log of population

Based on population (thousands).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009).

Political competition

It combines two concepts: the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political
competition, and the extent of government restriction on political competition. It ranges
from 1 (Suppressed competition) to 10 (Institutionalized Electoral).
Source: Polity IV Project. 2009. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions.
College Park: University of Maryland. Available online at
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/inscr/polity/index.htm

Openness to trade

Openness in constant prices: Exports plus Imports divided by real GDP per capita;
Laspeyres (in percentage).
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009).

Price of government
expenditures

Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over government consumption.
Source: Penn World Table, PWT6.3, Heston et al. (2009).
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Appendix IV: Summary statistics

Variable

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

Observations

Property tax collections

overall
between
within

0.39

0.21
0.20
0.06

0.06
0.12
0.16

0.74
0.64
0.52

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Fiscal Decentralization

overall
between
within

21.93

13.86
13.71
3.78

0.65
1.17
5.65

47.16
44.76
30.15

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Dependency on Transfers

overall
between
within

58.62

19.09
19.03
4.21

20.53
23.16
39.44

93.04
89.46
69.23

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Government size

overall
between
within

15.22

2.92
2.55
1.74

11.39
12.47
8.83

22.55
18.88
19.74

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Log of per capita GDP (PPP)

overall
between
within

8.86

0.42
0.41
0.19

8.06
8.20
8.37

9.98
9.36
9.48

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Per capita GDP (PPP)

overall
between
within

7,690

3,511
2,998
1,981

3,164
3,639
2,600

21,548
12,189
17,050

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Log of estimated property tax base
(per capita $US of year 2000)

overall
between
within

2.48

0.50
0.56
0.00

1.41
1.41
2.48

3.21
3.21
2.48

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Urban population

overall
between
within

74.21

11.21
11.36
1.81

54.66
57.21
69.54

91.80
89.59
79.36

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Competition for political positions

overall
between
within

2.71

0.53
0.30
0.44

1.00
2.22
1.49

3.00
3.00
3.49

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Index of democracy

overall
between
within

7.44

1.81
1.06
1.46

0.00
5.22
2.22

10.00
9.00
10.22

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Log of population

overall
between
within

10.27

0.96
1.11
0.07

8.60
8.71
10.11

12.15
12.10
10.43

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Political competition

overall
between
within

8.27

0.99
0.87
0.67

7.00
7.00
7.16

10.00
9.13
9.71

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Openness to trade

overall
between
within

50.74

21.99
24.44
8.86

21.22
23.54
28.20

138.80
107.66
81.89

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

Price level of gov. expenditures

overall
between
within

40.02

15.67
11.87
10.76

14.04
18.07
6.34

75.44
55.91
66.38

N=
n=
T-bar =

115
9
12.8

